dsh-permission-rules

dsh plugin --profile <name> add dsh-permission-rules

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Install & uninstall

• git channel (latest main): dsh plugin --profile web add github:PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules — the prepare script builds with production dependencies only.
• npm channel (published releases): dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-permission-rules.
• tarball channel: pnpm pack in this repo, then dsh plugin --profile web add ./dsh-permission-rules-<version>.tgz.
• uninstall: dsh plugin --profile web remove dsh-permission-rules.

⭐ 如果它帮到了你

这个插件是 DSH 插件家族的一员（95 个，全部 Apache-2.0）。如果你在用，给个 star —— 它不会解锁任何功能，但会让下一个人在搜索里更容易找到它。

English: part of a 95 plugin family for DeepSeek Harness. If it is useful, a star helps the next person find it — nothing is gated behind it.

What is dsh-permission-rules?

Claude Code-style declarative permission rules for DeepSeek Harness.

Rules decide what is known. A reviewer model decides what is not.

The same run, animated.

Compatibility

What you get

dsh-permission-rules puts an ordered allow / deny / ask rule list in front of every tool call on the tools/pre-execute waterfall — deterministic, instant, auditable, and written by you in plain YAML:

• deny blocks the call; the rule's reason becomes the model-visible error.
• ask rides the official approval seam (mount dsh-auto-review for a second-model answerer, or a human answers; with neither, the harness fails closed).
• allow (and no-match) strictly delegates via next() — downstream listeners are never short-circuited.

Every hit and every passthrough is audit-logged as a permissionRules/decision session event (log-only — nothing extra is injected into the model context).

• Rich matching — tool-name globs (including mcp__*), agent-identity selectors (main / subagent / preset:*), argument key/value globs or regexes (with !pattern negation and an absent key dimension), workspace-relative path globs at any nesting depth, when host conditions (env vars, platform), and shell command decomposition (argv: command word, argument tokens, pipeline signature) for token-precise command matching.
• Built-in high-risk baseline — a shipped deny/ask ruleset (destructive commands, privilege escalation, download-and-execute, sensitive paths) enabled by default and appended after user rules so a nearer user rule can override it; toggle with builtin.enabled.
• Hierarchical rule files — optional searchUp merges every .dsh/rules.yaml from the session cwd to the filesystem root, nearest first.
• Dry-run rollout — enforce: false audits what the policy would do while passing every call through.
• Hot reload — Chokidar watch with debounce; a broken edit keeps the previous rules, never crashes. On a WSL host, or for a rule file under /mnt/<drive>, the watch switches to polling because native change events are unreliable there.
• Fail loud — invalid YAML, unknown actions/fields, bad globs/regexes, backtracking-prone patterns, or more than maxRules rules fail the load.

Rule syntax

# <project>/.dsh/rules.yaml
rules:
  - match: { tools: [bash, pwsh], params: { command: "git push*" }, paths: ["**/secrets/**"] }
    action: deny
    reason: "No pushes from protected paths"

  - match: { tools: [edit, write] }
    action: ask
    reason: "File writes need confirmation"

• Match dimensions — tools (globs, incl. mcp__*), agents (main / subagent / preset:<name>; unknown identity never matches — fail closed), params (key/value globs or regexes, !pattern negation, absent key dimension), paths (workspace-relative globs extracted at any nesting depth), when (env var globs/regexes + a closed platform list), and network (domains / ips / ports / schemes — globs, wildcards, CIDRs, port ranges).
• Actions — allow / deny / ask, evaluated in file order, first match wins.
• Rule metadata — enabled: false (visible but inert), description, tags; unknown fields fail the load.
• Schema — a JSON Schema ships at docs/rules-format.schema.json (editor completion via # yaml-language-server: $schema=...); the full vocabulary and a 5-rule security baseline live in docs/rules-format.en.md.

Network policy

A Codex-style process-level network policy: shell subprocess traffic flows through a built-in local HTTP/CONNECT proxy, and every connection is decided by ordered network rules or by three modes mapped onto the official sandbox presets:

• deny-all — the read-only sandbox preset: block all outbound.

• whitelist — the workspace-write preset: allow listed targets, unlisted: ask (or deny) for the rest.

• allow-all — the danger-full-access preset: allow everything.

• auto (default) — follows the sandbox preset; on hosts without the sandbox-policy service it resolves to autoFallback (allow-all).

• Matching — match.network with domains / ips / ports / schemes (globs, wildcards, CIDRs, port ranges; numeric YAML ports are accepted). URL-candidate extraction on the tools/pre-execute hot path fires on web-tool arguments and URLs embedded in bash/pwsh command text; loopback targets can short-circuit rules per loopback policy. IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals are normalized to their IPv4 form before matching, and the proxy connects on the addresses the decision was made on — never a second DNS resolution — a connection whose adjudication resolved no address fails closed (502) instead of dialing the name.

• Upstream chaining — network.upstreamProxy (default off) sends the connections this proxy allows through an upstream proxy: CONNECT asks the upstream for a tunnel (CONNECT host:port) and plain-HTTP requests are forwarded to it in absolute form. A blocked target never reaches the upstream — it still gets this plugin's structured 403. Two cases never chain even when an upstream is configured: a loopback target (a proxy outside this host cannot route its loopback) and any decision produced by an ips-scoped rule (chaining hands the hostname to the upstream, so "the connection lands on an address the rules saw" — issue #21 — would stop holding exactly where the rules cared about the address; those decisions keep dialing the adjudicated address directly), plus a target whose scheme has no usable upstream. The upstream's own hostname is operator configuration, not agent input, and is not adjudicated by these rules. A URL carrying credentials is never emitted raw: warnings, /rules network and the settings snapshot mask the password (http://user:***@host:port). An unreachable upstream, a timeout (10 s), or a non-2xx answer yields 502 — there is deliberately no silent fallback to a direct dial, so a misconfiguration stays visible.

• Audit — denied connections append permissionRules/network to the owning session (same adaptive ignorable gate), with block counters and recent interceptions in /rules network and the settings page.

• Diagnosis — blocked connections carry a [network: …] message naming the blocked target, the mode or rule that decided, and the remediation.

• Allow from the settings page — every recent interception offers an Allow action. It writes ONE minimal match: { network: { domains: [<host>] } } / action: allow rule at the top (index 0) of the nearest rule file that actually judges that connection: the project file of the workspace the block was attributed to (the absolute rulesFile when one is configured), or, for a session-less host-level block, the file the host chain resolves (absolute rulesFile → existing <processCwd>/<rulesFile> → configured fallbackPath → <processCwd>/<rulesFile>, created) — and when several workspaces are loaded, the page first offers a picker, because any loaded workspace chain outranks the host chain. Index 0 because rules are first-match-wins: appended after an existing deny the rule would be dead text. domains only, because that dimension is subdomain-inclusive and port/scheme-agnostic, so the host is not re-blocked on its next port; existing comments and untouched rules survive, and the text goes through the same validation gate as a hand edit. The change takes effect immediately — the cached workspace chains AND the session-less host chain are re-read, so no restart and no /rules reload — and the decision is recomputed, so the notice reports the REAL outcome and never claims success while the connection is still blocked. It refuses, leaving the file untouched, an unknown workspace, a target outside the known rule sources, the read-only built-in baseline, and a file it cannot read or parse; an already-allowed connection writes nothing. network.allowHostAction: false hides the button and makes the RPC refuse.

Quick start

dsh plugin --profile web add github:PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules

# 1. install the bundle into your profile
dsh plugin --profile web add github:PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules

# or from npm (published releases)
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-permission-rules

# 2. restart and verify the row
dsh --profile web --dump-config | grep -A4 'id: permission-rules'

Configuration

All tunables are Schemastery Config fields (changeable from cordis.yml). An id-targeted override replaces the whole row — restate every key you need. On a 0.1.7-alpha host every field is declared .volatile(), so it is ALSO editable in place from the Plugins settings page: the edit is committed into the running references without remounting the plugin, the runtime reads the new value on its next use, and a change to network.proxyPort, proxyBind, injectEnv or noProxy rebinds the local proxy immediately. The numeric bounds live in the schema, and the config editor resolves the merged config against that schema before persisting, so an out-of-range value is refused at write time. On a host whose Schemastery predates volatile() these fields stay cordis.yml-only.

Tools & surfaces

/rules                        list the active rules, their source files, and any last-reload error
/rules list                   explicit alias for the bare listing
/rules reload                 re-read the rule-file chain for this workspace
/rules decisions [n]          show the last n permission decisions of this session (default 10)
/rules test <tool> <json>     dry-evaluate the rules against a hypothetical call

/rules test also accepts leading flags: --cwd <dir>, --env KEY=VALUE (repeatable), --agent <selector> (repeatable), and --platform <name>. In multi-file chains (e.g. searchUp), every listed rule line is attributed to its own source file.

Permissions & data

• Permissions: declares files:read, files:watch, files:write, session:append, and network:outbound in its workshop manifest. ask decisions ride the official approval seam — nothing is re-implemented or bypassed.
• Data: rule files are read from disk; no rule data is written. No model calls, no reviewer subagents.
• Session log: permissionRules/decision is never injected into the model context and is appended with the envelope's ignorable: true marker so any harness build loads the log.

Security boundaries

• Policy, not a kernel. paths